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 Stalk v. Mushkin, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 3 
(January 29, 2009)1 
TORT – STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Summary
Appeal from a district order granting summary judgment for intentional interference with
prospective business advantage, intentional interference with contractual relations, and breach of
fiduciary duty.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the claims for intentional
interference with prospective business advantage and contractual relations.  Reversed district
court’s grant of summary judgment on the claim for breach of fiduciary duty arising from the
attorney-client relationship.
Factual and Procedural History
Attorney Michael Mushkin served as legal counsel to Michelle Stalk and her company,
Urban Construction Company, LLC (Urban Construction) and to Allan Bird and his corporation,
Real Property Services Corporation (RPSC).  In May of 2001, Mushkin represented Stalk and
Urban Construction in its defense of various mechanics’s lien matters.  During the litigation of
the mechanic’s lien claims, Mushkin began representing RPSC in an employment wrongful
termination action.  Mushkin filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on behalf of
RPSC.  In that motion, he argued that the employee alleging wrongful termination was actually
an employee of Urban Construction and that Stalk had made the decision to terminate that
employee.  Mushkin further contended that Stalk and Urban Construction were indispensable
parties to the suit.  The district court denied RPSC’s motion.  Thereafter, the employee submitted
an amended complaint in January 2002, naming Urban Construction as a defendant to the action.
Stalk settled with the employee for $2000, but it was at the settlement conference in May 2003
that she discovered that Urban Construction became a party to the wrongful termination action
because of Mushkin’s motion for summary judgment.  
During this time, Urban Construction and RPSC had a business relationship spanning 30
years in the development of parcels of real property.  Specifically, they were parties to several
contracts for the performance of construction services; however in a letter dated June 7, 2001,
Bird terminated Urban Construction as general contractor for RPSC.  
Stalk and Urban Construction filed suit against Mushkin on August 24, 2004, claiming
negligence, intentional interference with prospective business advantage, intentional interference
with contractual relations, and breach of fiduciary duty.  Claims for intentional interference with
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prospective business advantage and intentional interference with contractual relations arose out
of allegations that Mushkin had prompted a friend to bid on the construction projects that Urban
Construction had contracted with RPSC to complete, and thus, it was Mushkin’s actions that
caused RPSC to terminate its contracts with Urban Construction in June of 2001.  On the other
hand, Stalk and Urban Construction premised the breach of fiduciary duty claim on Mushkin’s
actions in moving for summary judgment in the employment action, and thus, notifying the
employee that Stalk and Urban Construction were indispensable defendants.
The district court granted summary judgment on the negligence cause of action for failure
to state a claim.  As to remaining claims, the court granted summary judgment on grounds that
they were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations under N.R.S. 11.190(4)(e)2.  Stalk
and Urban Construction appealed the grant of summary judgment as to the claims for intentional
interference with prospective business advantage, intentional interference with contractual
relations, and breach of fiduciary duty.
 Discussion
Stalk and Urban Construction contended that both intentional interference claims were
subject to the four year statute of limitations under N.R.S. 11.190(2)(c)’s because damage is to
“intangible or inchoate interests in obtaining future benefits.”3  In contrast, Mushkin defended
that the district court properly applied the two-year statute of limitation under N.R.S. 11.190(4)
(e).4  Mushkin argued in the alternative that because a contract right is personal property, N.R.S.
11.190(3)(c)’s three-year limitation applied.5  Mushkin asserted that summary judgment was
proper under either statute because Stalk and Urban Construction filed their complaint more than
three years after the statute of limitations had began to run.
The Court considered the fact that Nevada has separate statutes that govern injuries to
persons and injuries to property, providing a split in authority as to which statute of limitations
applies for the intentional interference claims that this case addresses.  Accordingly, in
determining the statute of limitations applicable to claims for intentional interference with
prospective business advantage and contractual relations, the Court examined the true nature of
those claims.  In particular, the Court found that compensation for these claims address damages
to business interests which may include intangible rights and assets as well as those incidental to
business ownership.  As such, the Court found that these interests were personal property.
Because business interests are personal property, the Court concluded that intentional
interference with these business interests are not actions for injuries to a person, but actions for
taking personal property.  The Court determined that N.R.S. 11.190(4)(e) applies only to personal
injury and wrongful death actions.6  Accordingly, intentional interference with business interests
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.190(4)(e) (2007).  In particular, §11.190 outlines the period of limitations for actions in
Nevada not involving real property.  Id. § 11.190.
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.190(2)(c) (2007).
4  NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.190(4)(e) (2007).
5  Id.§ 11.190(3)(c).
6  Hanneman v. Downer, 871 P.2d 279, 287 n.8 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.190(4)(e) (2007).
is governed by the three-year statute of limitations of N.R.S. 11.190(3)(c) pertaining to injury of
personal property.7  
The district court applied the incorrect statute, but its grant of summary judgment in favor
of Mushkin for claims of intentional interference with prospective business advantage and with
contractual relations was proper under the three-year statute of limitations in N.R.S. 11.190(3)
(c).8  Specifically, Stalk and Urban Construction filed their suit on August 26, 2004, and the
statute of limitations began running when Bird terminated its contracts with Urban Construction
by the letter dated June 7, 2001.  Therefore, because the statute of limitations had run prior to
Stalk and Urban Construction filing this action, their claims were time-barred under N.R.S.
11.190(3)(c).9  The Court found that the district court properly entered summary judgment on
these two claims although on different grounds.
Stalk and Urban Construction, in their breach of fiduciary duty claim, contended that
Mushkin breached his fiduciary duty to them by disclosing information adverse to their interests
while in the capacity of their attorney and also representing RPSC in the employment
discrimination suit.  In particular, they allege that he breached his duties of undivided loyalty and
confidentiality when he provided information in the employment action that subjected them to
tort liability.  Stalk, Urban Construction, and Mushkin argued that the breach of fiduciary claim
is governed by N.R.S. 11.190(3)(d)’s three-year statute of limitations governing fraud claims.10
However, the Court found that the breach of fiduciary duty claim was based on duties of
Mushkin that would not exist but for the attorney-client relationship.  Therefore, the Court
considered Stalk and Urban Construction’s breach of fiduciary duty claim as essentially a claim
for legal malpractice.  The Court held that N.R.S. 11.207(1)11 sets forth the statute of limitations
for legal malpractice actions and thus, for claims alleging a breach of fiduciary duty arising out
of an attorney-client relationship.  On the other hand, N.R.S. 11.190(3)(d) sets forth the statute of
limitations for claims of fraud, specifically claims for breach of fiduciary duty based on non-
attorney client relationships.12  As a result, the district court’s application of N.R.S. 11.190(4)(e)
as to the breach of fiduciary duty claim was in error.13  The Court further found that genuine
issues of material fact existed regarding the date that the statute of limitations had began to run
7  NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.190(3)(c) (2007).
8  Id.
9  Id.
10  Id. § 11.190(3)(d).
11  NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.207(1) (2008).  Actions for breach of duty or contract against an attorney “must be
commenced within 4 years after the plaintiff sustains damage or within 2 years after the plaintiff discovers or . . .
should have discovered the material facts which constitute the cause of action, whichever occurs earlier.” Id. 
12  Id.§ 11.190(3)(d).
13  Id.§ 11.190(4)(e).
on the claim for breach of fiduciary duty.  Therefore, the district court erred by entering summary
judgment on that claim.  
Conclusion
The Court concluded that claims for intentional interference with prospective business
advantage and intentional interference with contractual relations are subject to the three-year
statute of limitations outlined in N.R.S. 11.190(3)(c) because they are claims for injury to
personal property.14  Although the district court applied the incorrect statute, summary judgment
was appropriate , and the Court affirmed the ruling because these claims were time-barred by the
three-year statute of limitations in N.R.S. 11.190(3)(c).15
The Court found that the district court had ruled in error that summary judgment was
appropriate regarding Stalk and Urban Construction’s breach of fiduciary duty claim under
N.R.S. 11.190(4)(e)’s two-year statute of limitations.16  Because the breach of fiduciary duty
claim in this case is a claim akin to legal malpractice, N.R.S. 11.207(1) is the applicable statute.17
Summary judgment was not appropriate because genuine issues of material facts existed as to
when the statute of limitations began to run.  Therefore, the Court reversed the grant summary
judgment as to the breach of fiduciary duty claim and remanded the matter to the district court.
14  Id.§ 11.190(3)(c).
15  Id.
16  Id. § 11.190(4)(e).
17  Id.§ 11.207(1).
